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THE FAMILY’S CONSTITUTION 
Douglas NeJaime* 
Many of the leading constitutional issues of our day implicate 
family law matters.1 Modern substantive due process is replete 
with questions of family law. Griswold v. Connecticut,2 Eisenstadt 
v. Baird,3 Roe v. Wade,4 Planned Parenthood v. Casey,5 and 
Lawrence v. Texas6 raise issues of family formation, intimate 
relationships, and reproductive decision making. Loving v. 
Virginia,7 Zablocki v. Redhail,8 and Turner v. Safley9 address the 
contours of marriage. Moore v. City of East Cleveland10 protects 
the extended family. Stanley v. Illinois,11 Lehr v. Robertson,12 and 
Michael H. v. Gerald D.13 consider the rights of unmarried fathers. 
Troxel v. Granville14 protects a parent’s childrearing decisions. 
Modern equal protection law, too, features a significant number 
of family law issues. A string of cases beginning in the late 1960s 
extends rights to nonmarital parent-child relationships.15 Leading 
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 1. See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 40 (2014); David D. 
Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 571 (2008). 
 2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 5. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 6. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 7. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 8. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 9. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 10. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 11. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 12. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 13. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 14. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 15. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 
391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
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sex equality decisions dating back to the 1970s render rights and 
responsibilities regarding marriage and childrearing formally 
gender neutral.16 Most recently, decisions on the rights of same-
sex couples to marry—namely, United States v. Windsor17 and 
Obergefell v. Hodges18—recognize the families formed by gays 
and lesbians on grounds of equal protection and due process. 
These cases are thought to represent a relatively 
straightforward account of the relationship between family law 
and constitutional law.19 On this account, family law is generally 
perceived as a body of state law.20 Legislatures pass statutes that 
define and regulate relationships between adults as well as 
parents and children.21 Courts resolve specific disputes by 
interpreting and applying these statutes, as well as through 
common law and equitable principles that have traditionally 
governed family law. (In resolving questions of family law, state 
courts seldom turn to constitutional doctrine—whether state or 
federal.22) Through this lens, domestic relations implicate matters 
of local concern; federal courts give states wide latitude to 
regulate the family, and thus only rarely do family law questions 
enter federal courts.23 When they do, courts attempt to leave 
 
 16. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); 
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 ( 1975). 
 17. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 18. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 19. In this Article, I am primarily concerned with federal, not state, constitutional 
law. To be sure, there is an extensive body of state constitutional law on questions of family 
rights and recognition. The relationship between state constitutional resolution of family 
law questions and subsequent federal constitutional resolution of similar questions is 
worthy of its own scholarly treatment. 
 20. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (“[T]here is no federal law 
of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.”). 
 21. This emphasis also ties to family law’s scope, which rests on the continued 
influence of the family/market distinction. For a brilliant genealogical account of how 
family law came to be preoccupied with “the formation of [marital and parental] 
relationships,” rather than with “distributional consequences,” see Janet Halley, What Is 
Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5–6 (2011); see also Janet 
Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189 (2011). 
 22. Of course, courts avoid constitutional questions as a general matter when cases 
can be resolved on other grounds. On the justifications for and criticisms of the avoidance 
canon, see Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts 
Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 184–89. 
 23. See, for instance, the domestic relations exception to federal diversity 
jurisdiction. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 
(21 How.) 582 (1859). For an insightful analysis and critique, see Naomi R. Cahn, Family 
Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073 (1994). On some of the 
historical and intellectual foundations of family law’s local character, see Halley, What Is 
Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, supra note 21, at 48–52 (tracing how the notion of 
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ample room for state regulation.24 Nonetheless, federal courts 
may eventually apply federal constitutional law in ways that 
invalidate forms of family regulation in many states.25 On this 
view, constitutional principles—primarily equal protection and 
due process—operate to discipline and reorient state family law, 
and family law responds by reforming itself in line with 
constitutional mandates.26 
This conventional account is inaccurate along a number of 
dimensions, some of which family law scholars have explored.27 I 
focus here on how this account distorts the interaction between 
family law and constitutional law. On the conventional 
understanding, family law and constitutional law exist in relatively 
separate spheres,28 but occasionally meet when constitutional law, 
exercising power in a top-down way, dictates new directions for 
family regulation.29 This account fails to capture the dialogic 
relationship between family law and constitutional law. It fails to 
see that family law and constitutional law often occupy the same 
 
marriage as status, and relatedly as outside the scope of the federal Constitution’s 
Contracts Clause, enabled deference to local control over marriage and divorce). 
 24. In Troxel, for instance, the Court struck down the Washington third-party 
visitation statute only as applied to the case before it, thus leaving to the states resolution 
of the contours of custody and visitation. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). In 
Troxel’s wake, statutory reform and litigation at the state level over grandparent visitation 
proliferated. 
 25. For instance, when the Court protected the rights of unmarried fathers as a 
matter of due process and the rights of nonmarital children as a matter of equal protection, 
it pushed states to significantly reform their approaches to parent-child relationships. 
 26. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1156, 1159 (1980) (“Government policy toward the family has traditionally been 
regarded as presenting local rather than national questions. . . . But the states’ power to 
legislate and administer family law has never been exempt from constitutional limitations. 
Restricting state power within constitutional bounds is an appropriate task for the federal 
judiciary, and carrying out this duty ‘does not make of [the Supreme] Court a court of 
probate and divorce.’ The Court has properly insisted that state intervention respect 
fundamental human rights.”) (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 233 
(1945)). 
 27. For example, Jill Hasday has extensively and persuasively shown the 
pervasiveness of federal family law. See HASDAY, supra note 1, at 17–66. 
 28. I use the term “separate spheres” deliberately, given that family law’s localism 
historically served to authorize and insulate a gender-hierarchical system. See Judith 
Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2199 (1993); Emily 
J. Sack, The Burial of Family Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 459, 468 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, She 
The People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 948, 1036 (2002). 
 29. But see Meyer, supra note 1, at 568–69 (arguing that more recent constitutional 
adjudication in family law conflicts reflects a more restrained approach, essentially 
“pushing the courts to balance the contending interests more evenly case-by-case”). 
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space, contribute to understandings of the same issues, and 
interact in mutually constitutive ways. Further, the conventional 
account fails to appreciate the ways in which family law exerts 
influence over constitutional law; family law shapes the terrain on 
which constitutional adjudication occurs, structures constitutional 
conflict, and orients constitutional reasoning. 
To many scholars of family law, this claim may seem obvious. 
Indeed, there is a rich family law literature challenging the 
conventional narrative that family law and federal law are, and 
should be, separate. Scholars have shown that, contrary to 
common assumptions, family law is not simply a matter of local 
control and is not outside the scope of federal oversight.30 Rather, 
specific bodies of federal law should be considered family law. By 
including constitutional oversight as a component of federal 
family law,31 this literature convincingly challenges the instinct of 
courts and commentators to view (state) family law and (federal) 
constitutional law as distinct. 
Nonetheless, this body of scholarship is more concerned with 
federalism, and thus levels of government rather than bodies of 
law. In contrast, this Article’s central concern relates to doctrinal, 
rather than governmental, boundaries. In particular, it focuses on 
family law—and specifically a body of case law and statutes 
regulating family relationships—and constitutional law—and 
primarily questions of equality and liberty. Indeed, while my 
analysis draws on the interaction between regulation of the family 
and federal constitutional law, similar observations may be made 
about family law and state constitutional decisions. 
Even as this Article attends to a dynamic that has yet to be 
explicitly elaborated, it joins existing family law scholarship that 
challenges conventional narratives about family law’s place in the 
legal order. My claim about the dialogic relationship between 
family law and constitutional law runs against tendencies that 
continue to dominate the treatment of family law and 
constitutional law.32 Identifying and unpacking this dialogic 
 
 30.  See Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1297 (1997); Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. 787 
(2015); Sylvia Law, Families and Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175 (2000). 
 31. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 870–83 
(2004); Joslin, supra note 30, at 787. 
 32. See HASDAY, supra note 1, at 222 (noting the failure “to understand family law’s 
relationship to the rest of the law”); Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage Equality and Its 
Relationship to Family Law, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 197, 206–07 (2017). 
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relationship is critical to appreciating the reach of family law, as 
well as the role of constitutional review in regulation of the 
family.33 It suggests that, with respect to divisive conflicts over the 
family, existing accounts both underestimate the power of state 
family law developments and overestimate the power of federal 
courts applying federal constitutional law. 
This Article captures the dialogic relationship between 
family law and constitutional law by drawing on my earlier work 
on the relationship between LGBT legal mobilization and the 
resolution of claims to marital and parental recognition.34 
Marriage and parenthood are central institutions in family law 
and receive protection as a matter of constitutional law. 
Contestation in family law over the meaning of marriage and 
parenthood has shaped understandings of these institutions for 
purposes of constitutional doctrine. And constitutional doctrine 
has in turn shaped family law disputes over the contours of marital 
and parental recognition. 
First, this Article examines family law reform aimed at 
nonmarital relationship and parental recognition for gays and 
lesbians. These family law developments contributed to new 
understandings of marriage and parenthood, as well as same-sex 
couples’ status within each. Constitutional claims to marriage 
equality gained traction after family law work altered the meaning 
and reach of marriage and parenthood, and positioned same-sex-
couple-headed families as similarly situated to different-sex-
couple-headed families for purposes of relationship and parental 
recognition. 
Accordingly, this Article then relates earlier family law 
reform to eventual constitutional adjudication of same-sex 
couples’ claims to marry. Federal courts considered whether 
same-sex couples merited inclusion in marriage in ways that were 
shaped by family law struggles over the romantic and parental 
relationships of gays and lesbians. Meanings forged in family law 
conflict structured how federal courts understood the purposes 
 
 33. Professor Courtney Joslin makes this point in responding to my work on the 
relationship between parentage law and marriage equality, noting that Marriage Equality 
and the New Parenthood “reminds us of some of the critical legal insights that can be lost 
when we fail to see legal questions as family law questions or through the lens of the 
family.” See Joslin, supra note 32, at 207. 
 34. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 1185 (2016); Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of 
Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87 (2014). 
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and boundaries of marriage and parenthood as a matter of 
constitutional doctrine. 
Appreciating the historical trajectory of same-sex 
marriage—and specifically situating same-sex marriage within 
broader conflicts over the family—enables us to see how marriage 
equality relates to a more capacious set of questions about family 
formation and recognition that lawmakers and judges will 
continue to confront.35 After exploring the impact of family law 
developments on constitutional decisions, this Article returns to 
family law. Rather than resolve family law questions, 
constitutional adjudication reshapes aspects of state family law, 
not only in a clear top-down manner but in more subtle ways. The 
inclusion of same-sex couples in marriage altered the meaning of 
marital parenthood by mainstreaming concepts of intentional and 
functional parenthood while rendering biological and gendered 
approaches to parenthood less dominant. With such inclusion 
occurring on constitutional terms, advocates for parental 
recognition have gained new and powerful arguments for reform 
of parentage law. Understanding marriage equality’s family law 
antecedents relates the constitutional embrace of same-sex 
marriage to parental recognition, making visible parenthood’s 
centrality to the equal status of gays and lesbians. 
Finally, this Article briefly contemplates the future 
interaction between family law and constitutional law, specifically 
with respect to parenthood. In the wake of marriage equality, 
shifts in the law of parental recognition have been expressed in 
constitutional terms. For married lesbian couples, constitutional 
protection for the nonbiological mother’s parent-child 
relationship has generally sounded in the register of equality. Due 
process protection for parental rights, in contrast, remains 
tethered to the biological connection between parent and child, 
even as family law has increasingly embraced concepts of 
parenthood that transcend biological relationships. Accordingly, 
this Article briefly contemplates how, if at all, family law shifts in 
 
 35. This perspective resonates with Reva Siegel’s approach to reading the 
constitutional guarantees of sex equality in light of struggles over women’s suffrage that 
culminated in the Nineteenth Amendment and its repudiation of gender-based family roles 
that facilitated and justified women’s exclusion from full democratic citizenship. See Siegel, 
supra note 28. Siegel’s work illustrates the importance of orienting constitutional sex 
equality to earlier conflicts over the family. 
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the meaning of parenthood might reverberate in constitutional 
conflict over parental rights. 
The examples of the dialogic relationship between family law 
and constitutional law presented here are meant to be illustrative 
and not exhaustive. They are limited to one context—LGBT 
family recognition—and focus on developments from a single 
jurisdiction—California. This Article’s larger purpose is to initiate 
a dialogue about family law and constitutional law—to challenge 
the conventional divide between family law and constitutional 
law, to open up questions about the concrete interaction between 
the two, and to begin the work of theorizing the relationship 
between them. In that spirit, this Article concludes by briefly 
suggesting how the account of family law and constitutional law 
articulated here might shed light on debates regarding law and 
social change. 
I. FAMILY LAW’S CONSTITUTIVE ROLE 
This Part shows how the development of state family law 
both relied on constitutional equality commitments and in turn 
contributed to evolving understandings of those commitments. 
Beginning in the 1980s, as both the HIV/AIDS crisis and the 
lesbian baby boom began, LGBT advocates fought for the rights 
of families created by gays and lesbians. Claims to family 
recognition are evident in both statutory reform and litigation, 
and these claims are observable in work relating to both adult 
relationship recognition and parental recognition. Advocates 
portrayed same-sex-couple-headed families as like different-sex-
couple-headed families, and framed the extension of nonmarital 
rights and recognition to same-sex couples as an equality measure. 
The specific ways in which same-sex-couple-headed families were 
painted as like different-sex-couple-headed families contributed 
to understandings of marriage and parenthood that would 
ultimately shape constitutional approaches to same-sex marriage. 
A. RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION: ARTICULATING  
EQUALITY AND APPROXIMATING MARRIAGE 
With same-sex couples excluded from marriage, LGBT 
activists engineered the concept of domestic partnership as a 
partial remedy for the discrimination faced by gays and lesbians. 
Same-sex couples were depicted by advocates as like different-sex 
couples, even though they were excluded from marriage. Through 
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this lens, same-sex couples lived marriage-like lives, and thus their 
claims to nonmarital recognition sounded in equality. Because 
domestic partnership represented, at least in part, a response to 
same-sex couples’ exclusion from marriage, and because LGBT 
advocates needed to persuade others who prioritized marriage as 
a model of family recognition, it made sense to approach domestic 
partnership as approximating the qualities of marriage and 
accommodating marriage-like relationships.36 
Efforts to achieve domestic partnership at the local level 
leveraged newly won antidiscrimination mandates. In 1978, both 
San Francisco and Berkeley enacted ordinances that prohibited 
sexual orientation discrimination in employment, housing, and 
public accommodations.37 The following year, in response to 
Berkeley’s ordinance, a leading LGBT activist urged the city to 
provide healthcare coverage to same-sex partners of municipal 
employees.38 It was unfair, he argued, to use marriage as the sole 
eligibility criterion for benefits, and so suggested that the city 
create a “domestic partnership” designation to repair the 
problem.39 In nearby San Francisco, an openly gay elected official 
also proposed a domestic partnership system in the wake of sexual 
orientation nondiscrimination protections.40 
Even as early domestic partnership proposals included both 
same-sex and different-sex couples, LGBT advocates drew 
distinctions between the two in ways that emphasized the harms 
that same-sex couples in particular experienced as a result of their 
exclusion from marriage. In San Francisco, for instance, activists 
noted that different-sex couples’ “temporary, voluntary exclusion 
when they do not choose to marry is not equal to [same-sex 
 
 36. The brief account presented here draws on my comprehensive examination of 
the history of nonmarital relationship recognition in California. See NeJaime, Before 
Marriage, supra note 34. While the examples are taken from that article, I provide citations 
here to the primary sources. 
 37. Les Ledbetter, Bill on Homosexual Rights Advances in San Francisco, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1978, at A21; Berkeley City Code §13.28.010 et seq. See also Berkeley 
Council Approves Strong Gay Rights Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1978, at B28. 
 38. See Leland Traiman, A Brief History of Domestic Partnerships, 15 GAY & 
LESBIAN REV. 23, 23 (2008). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See Wallace Turner, Couple Law Asked for San Francisco, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 
1982, at A1; An Ordinance To Create a Record of Domestic Partnerships, Draft at 1 (1982) 
(from the files of Matt Coles) (on file with author). 
NEJAIME_DRAFT 9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/17 7:02 AM 
2017] THE FAMILY’S CONSTITUTION 421 
 
couples’] permanent, involuntary, and categorical exclusion.”41 On 
this view, the domestic partnership policy was critical not simply 
to extend benefits to more relationships but rather to partially 
compensate for the unequal treatment of same-sex couples vis-à-
vis marriage. 
While San Francisco Mayor Dianne Feinstein vetoed the 
ordinance passed by the Board of Supervisors,42 lesbian and gay 
activists in Berkeley took their grievances to the city’s Human 
Relations and Welfare Commission (HRWC). They argued that 
the use of marriage as the eligibility criterion for employee 
benefits “has a discriminatory effect against lesbians and gay 
men.”43 When HRWC later held hearings on the issue, LGBT 
activists expressed support for a domestic partnership policy as a 
remedy to “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”44 
Same-sex couples, they demanded, should “receive [their] fair 
share and not be excluded from ‘spousal benefits.’”45 Importantly, 
the domestic partnership demand did not explicitly challenge the 
link between marriage and family-based benefits, but instead 
suggested that same-sex couples deserved those benefits and yet 
were ineligible to marry. 
When HRWC later recommended that the city adopt a 
domestic partnership policy,46 it focused on how exclusionary 
marriage laws specifically injured same-sex couples: “All 
unmarried opposite-gender couples are able to move voluntarily 
across the ‘marriage barrier,’” but “[a]ll same-gender couples are 
unable to move across the ‘marriage barrier’—forever and 
regardless of their will.”47 In this way, HRWC framed a domestic 
partnership policy that would ultimately cover both same-sex and 
different-sex couples primarily as an equality measure for same-
sex couples. Indeed, HRWC did not purport to seek a “generally 
better” system of benefits distribution, but, given that it was 
responding “to a particular set of complaints” from “members of 
 
 41. Points To Remember When Countering Opposition or Criticism, in personal 
notes of Matt Coles (1982) (on file with author). 
 42. David Morris, SF Mayor Vetoes Domestic Partners Bill, 10 GAY COMM’Y NEWS 
1 (1982). 
 43. Memorandum from Human Relations and Welfare Commission, to Hon. Mayor 
and Members of the City Council 1 (July 17, 1984) (on file with author). 
 44. Id. at 4–6. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. at 20. 
 47. Id. at 9. 
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the lesbian/gay community,” sought “to make the benefits 
program specifically more equal.”48 
In staking out the equal status of same-sex couples (ineligible 
to marry) with respect to different-sex couples (eligible to marry), 
HRWC urged a domestic partnership regime that 
“approximate[d] the current marriage criterion.”49 Domestic 
partnership, it recommended, should be defined to include two 
people “not related by blood closer than would bar marriage” 
who “reside[] together and share the common necessities of life” 
and are “responsible for [each other’s] common welfare.”50 This 
policy mirrored the earlier San Francisco proposal, which defined 
domestic partners as “[t]wo individuals”: 
(a) “not related by blood,” 
(b) “[n]either is married, nor are they related by 
marriage,” 
(c) who “share the common necessaries of life,” 
(d) “declare that they are each other’s principal domestic 
partner,” and 
(e) “[n]either has, within the last six months[,] declared 
to any City department that he or she has a different 
domestic partner.”51 
While efforts in San Francisco at that point had failed, Berkeley 
officials adopted HRWC’s proposed domestic partnership policy 
in 1984. Framed as an equality measure for same-sex couples, the 
policy nonetheless applied to unmarried city employees in either 
a same-sex or different-sex relationship. 
As the efforts from Berkeley and San Francisco illustrate, the 
earliest domestic partnership protections were framed in large 
part as sexual orientation equality measures, even when they 
included different-sex couples otherwise eligible to marry. The 
government extended family-based protections to same-sex 
couples as a partial remedy for lesbian and gay exclusion from 
 
 48. Id. at 18. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 20. 
 51. Domestic Partnerships, Amending San Francisco Administrative Code by 
Adding Chapter 45 Thereto, Establishing Domestic Partnerships and Requiring Boards, 
Commissions and Departments of the City and County of San Francisco To Afford to 
Domestic Partners the Same Rights and Privileges as Spouses at 1 (1982) (on file with 
author). 
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marriage. Because same-sex couples acted like married couples, 
LGBT advocates suggested, they merited recognition that 
approximated marriage.  
In articulating the ways in which same-sex couples were like 
married couples, LGBT activists also articulated shared 
understandings of marriage. Advocates’ sameness arguments did 
not simply assimilate gays and lesbians to dominant norms and 
shore up the centrality of marriage. Instead, with same-sex 
couples in view, marriage’s focus shifted from gender 
differentiation and procreation to romantic affiliation and 
financial and emotional interdependence. In portraying same-sex 
couples as marriage-like to secure nonmarital recognition, LGBT 
activists contributed to an understanding of same-sex couples as 
deserving of marriage and an understanding of marriage as 
consistent with same-sex-couple-headed families. 
B. PARENTAL RECOGNITION: SHIFTING MEANINGS OF 
PARENTHOOD AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION EQUALITY 
Just as LGBT advocates worked in the space outside 
marriage to both stake out the equal status of same-sex 
relationships and secure rights for same-sex couples, they also 
worked in the space outside marriage to assert claims to family 
equality and attain parental recognition for same-sex parents.52 
Claims to parental recognition under the Uniform Parentage Act 
(UPA) illustrate. 
The 1973 UPA, which provided a statutory scheme to 
recognize parent-child relationships, followed constitutional 
decisions rejecting discrimination against nonmarital children and 
recognizing the parental rights of unmarried fathers.53 Many 
states, including California, adopted the UPA with modifications. 
While the UPA clearly did not contemplate the families formed 
by same-sex couples, by the late 1990s, LGBT advocates in 
California began to assert claims to parental recognition under 
the UPA.54 
 
 52. Again, the brief account presented here draws on my comprehensive 
examination of the history of nonmarital parental recognition in California. See NeJaime, 
Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34. While the examples are taken 
from that article, I provide citations here to the primary sources. 
 53. See id. at 1194–95. 
 54. See id. at 1212–29. 
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For marital families, legislatures adopting the UPA, and 
courts applying its provisions, had increasingly used concepts of 
intent and function to protect parent-child relationships, often for 
parents who lacked biological ties to their children.55 The UPA 
regulated donor insemination by providing that the husband of a 
woman who gives birth to a child conceived with donor sperm 
shall “be treated in law as if he were the natural father.”56 
Marriage to the mother provided evidence of his intent to parent. 
Principles of intent eventually began to shape determinations 
of motherhood as well. In Johnson v. Calvert, a case involving 
gestational surrogacy, the California Supreme Court applied the 
UPA to recognize the intended mother and her husband, who 
were also the child’s genetic parents, as the child’s legal parents—
over the objection of the gestational surrogate.57 Later, the 
California Court of Appeal extended the logic of both Johnson 
and the donor-insemination statute to a woman who had neither 
a gestational nor genetic connection to her child. In Marriage of 
Buzzanca, the court recognized as parents a divorcing husband 
and wife who had engaged a gestational surrogate to carry a child 
conceived with donor egg and sperm.58 Guided by the UPA’s 
regulation of donor insemination, the court recognized the 
married parents based not on biological connections but on 
intentional relationships. 
To leverage these developments in ways that reached same-
sex couples, who were still excluded from marriage, LGBT 
advocates argued that recognition of nonbiological parents should 
extend to nonmarital families. To do so, they portrayed same-sex 
couples’ nonmarital families as sufficiently marriage-like to merit 
similar forms of parental recognition, even as they argued against 
marriage as a dividing line for parentage. 
Consider an early, important victory before the California 
Board of Equalization—an unlikely venue for family law reform.59 
Helmi Hisserich claimed as her dependent the child whom she 
and her registered domestic partner, Tori Patterson, were raising. 
Lawyers at the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR) 
argued that Hisserich, the nonbiological parent, was the parent 
 
 55. See id. at 1195–96, 1208–12. 
 56. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a) (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
 57. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
 58. Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
 59. Hisserich, Case No. 99A-0341, 2000 WL 1880484 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Nov. 1, 2000). 
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based on the “doctrine of intentional parenthood” embraced in 
Johnson and Buzzanca.60 In its 2000 decision, the Board of 
Equalization accepted this argument: 
Appellant and her domestic partner, unable to marry under 
California law, registered as domestic partners with the city, 
county, and state in which they lived; they maintained a 
committed relationship for a substantial period of time prior to 
the decision to have a child; they decided to have a child 
together with the specific intent to rear the child together; they 
voluntarily and knowingly consented to the artificial 
insemination of Ms. Patterson with a licensed California sperm 
bank under the direction of a licensed California physician; 
appellant further exhibited her intent to be Madeline’s parent 
by initiating adoption proceedings following Madeline’s birth; 
and they lived together, conducted themselves, and held 
themselves out to the community as a family following the birth 
of Madeline.61 
The relationship between Hisserich and Patterson, which as 
a strictly legal matter was irrelevant to the parent-child 
relationship, furnished evidence of the couple’s intent to co-
parent. Moreover, the fact that Hisserich and Patterson were 
“unable to marry under California law” appeared relevant to the 
Board’s approach to their family. Their marriage-like but legally 
nonmarital relationship, as well as their joint decision to have and 
raise a child within that relationship, brought them within the 
intent-based concepts articulated in Johnson and Buzzanca, 
which had involved married couples. Indeed, the board deemed it 
“essential to [its] conclusion that appellant and Ms. Patterson . . . 
are an unmarried couple who maintained a committed 
relationship[.]”62 In depicting Hisserich and Patterson as 
sufficiently marriage-like to merit treatment analogous to married 
parents, the Board advanced, at least implicitly, a particular view 
of marriage, and marital parenting specifically; married couples, 
just like Hisserich and Patterson, formed intimate, committed 
relationships and then jointly decided to bring children into their 
families and to raise those children together. Biological 
procreation and gender-differentiated parenting seemed 
immaterial to this model of marital parenting. 
 
 60. Id. at *2. 
 61. Id. at *4. 
 62. Id. at *5 (emphasis added). 
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By 2005, the California Supreme Court took up the question 
of recognition of nonbiological lesbian co-parents. By that point, 
not only had the California courts and legislature recognized 
nonbiological parents in the context of marriage, but they had also 
recognized nonbiological mothers and fathers outside of 
marriage.63 The UPA provided that a man who “receives the child 
into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child” 
is presumed to be the child’s legal father.64 In its 2002 Nicholas H. 
decision, the California Supreme Court held that an unmarried 
father could hold a child out as his “natural” child, and thus satisfy 
the relevant presumption of paternity, even if he acknowledged 
from the start that the child was not his biological child.65 Soon 
after Nicholas H., the California Court of Appeal, in Karen C., 
recognized a woman as a mother even though she was not the 
child’s biological mother, based on the fact that she held the child 
out as her own.66 The case, which arose outside the context of 
same-sex parenting, tested the reach of the UPA’s gender-
neutrality directive, which provided that “[i]nsofar as practicable, 
the provisions . . . applicable to the father and child relationship 
apply” to the mother and child relationship.67 
The recognition of nonbiological parents in same-sex couples 
now posed a question of equality. Of course, nonrecognition of 
same-sex parents undermined key objectives of the family law 
system; government officials eager to privatize dependency 
sought to find parents who could provide not only emotional but 
financial support to children.68 But nonrecognition of same-sex 
parents also conflicted with emergent equality principles. If other 
nonbiological parents, including both women and men in both 
marital and nonmarital families, obtained legal recognition, the 
exclusion of same-sex-couple-headed families appeared not only 
unfair but unconstitutional. 
In Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, the 
nonbiological lesbian co-parent, Elisa, sought to avoid parental 
 
 63. See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34, at 1216–
18. 
 64. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
 65. In re Nicholas H., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. 2002). 
 66. In re Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 67. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
 68. See Melissa Murray, Family Law’s Doctrines, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1985, 2008–09 
(2015). 
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obligations to children born to her partner, Emily.69 Representing 
Emily, the biological mother asserting that her former partner was 
also a legal parent, lawyers at NCLR emphasized the equality 
commitments animating the UPA and linked those commitments 
to constitutional principles. Refusing to find Elisa to be a legal 
parent, they argued, “is inconsistent with the UPA’s goal of 
providing equality for nonmarital children and with the equal 
protection guarantees of the California and federal 
constitutions.”70 The claim to parental recognition now 
constituted a claim to equality, articulated in terms of not only 
family law but also constitutional law: 
[U]nder any form of equal protection analysis, an 
interpretation of California’s parentage laws that denies legal 
recognition of Elisa’s and Ry and Kaia’s parent-child 
relationships would be unconstitutional. It is patently irrational 
to recognize as legal parents: (1) a wife who consents to the 
insemination of a gestational surrogate by her husband, as in 
Johnson; (2) a wife and a husband who consent to the 
insemination of a gestational surrogate using a donated egg and 
donated sperm, as in Buzzanca; (3) a man who holds himself 
out as a child’s father, but is neither married to the child’s 
mother nor biologically related to child, as in Nicholas H.; and 
(4) a woman who holds herself out as a child’s mother, but is 
neither married to the child’s father nor biologically related to 
the child, as in Karen C., but to deny legal parentage to a 
lesbian who consented to her partner’s artificial insemination 
with the intention of parenting the resulting children and who 
subsequently assumed parental responsibility for the children 
and held herself out as their parent to the world.71 
Constitutional equality principles, the attorneys argued, should 
animate interpretation and application of the UPA in light of a 
string of family law decisions extending parental recognition on 
grounds of intent and function. 
 
 69. Consolidated Answer Brief on the Merits, Elisa B. v. Super. Ct. of El Dorado 
Cty., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). Elisa and Emily had three children together; Elisa was the 
biological mother of one, and Emily was the biological mother of the other two. The 
women were raising all three children together as their children. After the relationship 
dissolved, Elisa disclaimed any responsibility for the two children biologically related to 
Emily, seeking to preserve only her relationship to the child to whom she was biologically 
related. 
 70. Opening Brief of Real Party in Interest Emily B., at 14, Elisa B. v. El Dorado 
Cty. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). 
 71. Id. at 38. 
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The marriage-like family formation of Elisa and Emily 
buttressed the equality claim to parental recognition. If Elisa and 
Emily, excluded from marriage, acted like married couples who 
form families with children, denying legal recognition to their 
parental relationships seemed not only unfair but illogical. 
Accordingly, NCLR lawyers drew attention to the planned, 
functional family formed by Elisa and Emily. The opening 
paragraph of facts explained: “Elisa and Emily were in a 
committed relationship for more than six years. They had a 
commitment ceremony, exchanged rings, and pooled their 
finances. In 1995, Elisa and Emily decided to have children 
together.”72 Like Hisserich and Patterson in NCLR’s earlier case, 
Elisa and Emily had a marriage-like relationship. They evidenced 
emotional and economic interdependence in ways that recalled 
the framing of same-sex relationships in earlier domestic 
partnership efforts. Their decision to have children followed from 
their creation of a marriage-like family unit, which itself provided 
evidence of their intent to parent together and demonstrated 
parental conduct. Again, on this view, marriage featured 
committed intimate relationships and joint efforts to have and 
raise children; sexual procreation, gender differentiation, and 
biological parenting had fallen out of view. 
The California Supreme Court, relying heavily on Nicholas 
H., recognized Elisa, the nonbiological co-parent, as a legal parent 
under the UPA’s “holding out” provision.73 Appealing to central 
concerns of family law—”the state’s interest in the welfare of the 
child and the integrity of the family”74—the court embraced a 
notion of social, rather than biological, parenthood for both 
different-sex and same-sex parenting in both marital and 
nonmarital contexts. Even though the constitutional claims that 
NCLR pressed in making the case for recognition did not feature 
in the decision itself, the result furthered commitments to equality 
by affording recognition to parents in same-sex couples. Same-sex 
couples had been deemed appropriate subjects for parental 
recognition, even as they remained excluded from marriage. 
Over the course of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries, family law work by LGBT advocates had accomplished 
much. Even as recognition of the romantic and parental bonds 
 
 72. Id. at 7. 
 73. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). 
 74. Id. at 668. 
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formed by gays and lesbians advanced family law priorities, such 
as privatizing dependency and promoting children’s welfare, such 
recognition also staked out the family as a critical site of LGBT 
equality. Furthermore, it set up claims to marital recognition by, 
on one hand, framing same-sex couples as sufficiently marriage-
like to merit inclusion and, on the other hand, contributing to 
understandings of marriage that mapped onto the lives of same-
sex couples. In this sense, LGBT advocacy was driven by 
assimilationist impulses and, at the same time, more 
transformative instincts. In fact, as I show in other work, 
assimilationist claims—that is, that same-sex couples are like 
married different-sex couples—subtly forced law to reckon with 
and accommodate distinctive features of families formed by same-
sex couples.75 
II. CONSTITUTING MARRIAGE 
This Part turns to the acceptance of same-sex couples’ claims 
to marriage as a matter of federal constitutional law. It shows how 
family law developments relating to nonmarital rights and 
recognition structured understandings of the connection between 
constitutionally protected liberties—like marriage and 
parenthood—and sexual orientation equality. If marriage were 
defined by mutual commitment, romantic affiliation, and 
emotional and economic interdependence, same-sex couples 
could make persuasive claims to inclusion. If marital parenting 
were defined by intentional and functional parent-child bonds, 
rather than by biological procreation and gender-differentiated 
parenting, same-sex couples could convincingly argue for 
inclusion. 
A. MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Claims to marriage equality both predated and followed from 
LGBT advocacy seeking nonmarital rights and recognition for 
families formed by gays and lesbians. Litigation for same-sex 
marriage emerged in the U.S. in the 1970s, but was met with 
uniform rejection.76 The modern marriage equality movement 
 
 75. See Douglas NeJaime, Differentiating Assimilation, STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, 
AND SOCIETY (forthcoming 2018) (draft on file with author). 
 76. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
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traces its origins to litigation in Hawaii in the early 1990s,77 
following a period of LGBT advocacy focused on nonmarital 
recognition. For many years after the Hawaii litigation, marriage 
claims moved forward primarily at the state level, under state 
constitutional law.78 It was not until the late 2000s that federal 
courts became important actors in same-sex marriage litigation.79 
Eventually, in 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court, with decisions in 
Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry,80 intervened in the marriage 
fight. In Windsor, the Court opened the way to federal recognition 
of same-sex couples’ marriages,81 and in Hollingsworth, it let stand 
a federal district court ruling extending marriage to same-sex 
couples in California.82 In the wake of these decisions, federal 
courts, one after another, struck down state bans on same-sex 
marriage, leading ultimately to the Court’s recognition of same-
sex couples’ nationwide right to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges in 
2015.83 Windsor and Obergefell, and the federal decisions between 
them, were framed around constitutional principles of equality 
and liberty. After all, it was a claim to marriage—a fundamental 
right—and equality—a constitutional guarantee—that was being 
adjudicated. 
This focus on the constitutional norms animating the 
marriage claim locates marriage equality within a trajectory of 
decisions protecting the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians. 
Indeed, the Obergefell Court invoked not only the Supreme 
Court’s equal protection reasoning in Windsor, but also its earlier 
decisions in Romer v. Evans,84 which struck down Colorado’s 
Amendment 2, and Lawrence,85 which struck down Texas’s 
“homosexual conduct” law. The Court framed the question of 
same-sex marriage as emerging out of these constitutional 
developments on the rights of gays and lesbians. After addressing 
 
 77. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 78. See Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1248–50 (2010). 
 79. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has 
Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L. REV. 275, 281–82 (2013). 
 80. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. 
Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 81. 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
 82. 133 S. Ct. 2652. 
 83. Obergefell v. Hodges, 133 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 84. Romer v. Evans, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 85. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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the trajectory from Bowers v. Hardwick,86 which rejected a 
constitutional challenge to anti-sodomy laws, to Romer and 
Lawrence, the Court declared: “Against this background, the 
legal question of same-sex marriage arose.”87 
The constitutional focus also situates the marriage claim 
within a line of precedents on the constitutional status of 
marriage. The Obergefell Court turned to cases outside the LGBT 
context, from Griswold and Loving to Zablocki and Turner, to 
buttress its reasoning about same-sex marriage.88 Marriage 
equality, in other words, became part of an important 
constitutional tradition. 
This constitutional framing of the marriage claim obscures 
the role of family law. Indeed, nowhere did the Obergefell Court 
discuss the history of domestic partnership and the municipal 
fights over the recognition of same-sex relationships beginning in 
the 1980s. Yet, as we have seen, the claims to marriage followed 
from years of LGBT advocacy seeking equal treatment for the 
families formed by lesbians and gay men. Perhaps because earlier 
family law work did not generally speak in the register of 
fundamental rights or equal protection, there has been little 
attempt to connect it explicitly to subsequent claims to marriage 
equality.89 In fact, to the extent scholars have related the two, the 
tendency has been to see them as motivated by different concerns, 
pushing different goals, and ultimately moving in different 
directions. Through this lens, LGBT family law work over the past 
several decades was driven by objectives traditionally rooted in 
family law—such as the welfare of children and support for 
diverse family arrangements. Marriage equality, on the other 
hand, has been seen as prioritizing formal equality and civil rights 
over family law efforts to support a range of dependency 
relationships.90 This perspective tends to affirm the impulse to 
place the marriage equality claim outside the trajectory of family 
law work occurring at the state level.91 
 
 86. Bowers v. Hardwick, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 87. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596. 
 88. Id. at 2598–99. 
 89. See Joslin, supra note 32, at 199. 
 90. For leading accounts, see NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) 
MARRIAGE (2008); Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387 (2012). 
 91. See NeJaime, Before Marriage, supra note 34, at 165. 
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The claim to equal recognition of the families formed by 
same-sex couples—a claim articulated eventually through 
marriage equality advocacy—was forged in the domain of family 
law before marriage occupied its central role in LGBT advocacy 
and in the space outside of formal marriage. That earlier work 
spoke the language of family law but did so in ways that reflected 
constitutional norms of equality and liberty. And it constructed a 
model of family—including both marriage and parenthood—that 
ultimately supported the constitutional claim to marriage 
equality. This is not to say that LGBT work in family law 
deliberately set up claims to marriage; indeed, marriage was not a 
priority for advocates working in family law in the 1980s and early 
1990s, and many of these advocates supported a family diversity 
agenda that decentered marriage.92 Yet, as I have shown in other 
work, even those advocates contesting the centrality of marriage 
found that marriage anchored their efforts; simply to achieve 
nonmarital rights, they often cast same-sex couples in marriage-
like terms to persuade both government actors and potential 
allies.93 As the discussion that follows shows, once marriage claims 
proliferated, earlier family law work—including work animated 
by the drive to make marriage less important—shaped both the 
framing of marriage claims and the terms on which marriage 
claims were contested.94 
B. MARRIAGE EQUALITY’S FAMILY LAW ROOTS 
The fight over marriage equality recapitulated battles waged 
on the terrain of family law. Commentators have largely failed to 
notice this dynamic, continuing to view family law outside the lens 
of national, constitutional, civil rights law. When we put family 
law into focus, we see that decisions on marriage equality 
culminating with Obergefell were expressed in the register of 
constitutional law, yet held within them family law insights 
produced by many years of LGBT advocacy. Again, 
understandings of both the adult relationship and the parent-child 
relationship illustrate this dynamic. These understandings should 
 
 92. See id. at 104–12. 
 93. See id. at 161–62. 
 94. Of course, the LGBT movement was hardly the first to shape the meaning of 
marriage. Both civil rights advocates and feminist activists contributed to new 
understandings of marriage. 
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orient marriage equality to claims of family rights and recognition 
arising today. 
Key elements of nonmarital relationship recognition are 
observable in subsequent approaches to marriage claims—with 
respect both to how courts conceptualized marriage and to 
whether they viewed same-sex couples as similarly situated to 
different-sex couples for purposes of marriage.95 Consider the 
federal district court’s opinion in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the 
challenge to California’s Proposition 8. Determining that 
California’s ban on same-sex marriage violated federal 
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process, the 
court declared: 
Marriage is the state recognition and approval of a couple’s 
choice to live with each other, to remain committed to one 
another and to form a household based on their own feelings 
about one another and to join in an economic partnership and 
support one another and any dependents.96 
The court’s language mirrored the attributes of domestic 
partnership from its origins in Berkeley and San Francisco.  
 The district court’s decision became the governing decision 
in the case, after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hollingsworth. But 
before that, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on 
narrower grounds. In doing so, it articulated the attributes of 
marriage in terms that reflected meanings forged in battles for 
domestic partnership. “[B]ecause we acknowledge the financial 
interdependence of those who have entered into an ‘enduring’ 
relationship,” the court explained, “[w]e allow spouses but not 
siblings or roommates to file taxes jointly.”97 For the Perry courts, 
intimate adult commitment and emotional and economic 
interdependence—not gender differentiation and procreation—
defined marriage, just as those concepts had defined domestic 
partnership.98 
 
 95. See id. at 165–71. 
 96. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 961 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 97. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 98. For a similar framing by LGBT advocates themselves, see Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to the Motions to 
Dismiss of Defendants Christopher Rich and State of Idaho, at 6, Latta v. Otter (D. Id. 
2014) (“The legal institution of marriage under Idaho law is a contractual relationship 
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The focus on intimate adult affiliation and mutual emotional 
and financial support is also evident in Obergefell. There the 
Court described marriage as an “enduring bond, [in which] two 
persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, 
intimacy, and spirituality.”99 In explaining why marriage is 
fundamental for constitutional purposes, the Court first focused 
on adult partnership, declaring that “the right to marry is 
fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any 
other in its importance to the committed individuals.”100 
The Obergefell Court emphasized not only the emotional but 
material dimensions of marriage—underscoring marriage’s 
distributive function. Marriage, the Court recognized, is “the basis 
for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and 
responsibilities.”101 Domestic partnership efforts, which sought to 
extend benefits like health insurance coverage to same-sex 
couples excluded from marriage, underwrote this model of 
marital recognition. Advocates established the relevance of 
material benefits to the lives of same-sex couples not only in 
marriage work that began in the early 1990s but also in work on 
behalf of unmarried same-sex couples that began in the early 
1980s. As the domestic partnership regime had clearly evidenced, 
same-sex couples needed and wanted the material rights and 
benefits attached to marriage just as much as their different-sex 
counterparts. As the Obergefell Court concluded: “There is no 
difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect 
to this principle.”102 While the Court mustered constitutional 
precedents, like Griswold, Loving, and Turner, to support its 
assertions about marriage’s tangible and intangible attributes, the 
understanding of marriage that emerges from Obergefell also 
reflects years of LGBT advocacy on behalf of nonmarital 
recognition.  
From the Court’s perspective, marriage is not primarily 
defined by procreation and childrearing. In fact, the Court made 
clear that the right to marry is no “less meaningful for those who 
do not or cannot have children. An ability, desire, or promise to 
 
embodying a couple’s desire to commit themselves publicly to one another, and to 
undertake legal duties to care for and protect each other and any children they may have, 
as they move through life together as a family.”). 
 99. Obergefell v. Hodges, 133 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 2601. 
 102. Id. 
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procreate is not and has not been a prerequisite for a valid 
marriage.”103 Strikingly, though, the constitutional case for 
marriage focused on children even as it distanced marriage from 
procreation. This too reflected developments pushed by earlier 
LGBT advocacy in family law. Parenting efforts simultaneously 
supported both adult-centered and child-centered approaches to 
the constitutional claim to marriage. The recognition of lesbian 
and gay parents outside of marriage discredited justifications for 
the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage at the same time 
that it rendered same-sex couples suitable subjects for a child-
centered model of marriage. 
On one hand, the marriage claim leveraged the separation of 
marriage and parenting, as well as the vindication of nonmarital 
parenting, in earlier family law work. In California, as the Perry 
district court concluded, defending a marriage ban based on 
childrearing seemed irrational when the state “treated same-sex 
parents identically to opposite-sex parents.”104 More broadly, the 
state’s embrace of lesbian and gay parenting constituted part of a 
broader trend loosening marriage’s grip on parenting. As the 
Ninth Circuit explained, California’s “laws governing parenting 
. . . are distinct from its laws governing marriage.”105 The robust 
recognition of nonmarital parenting, advanced by LGBT 
advocates, made child-based justifications for restrictive marriage 
laws appear illogical. Parenting did not depend on marriage, and, 
as the Obergefell Court reasoned, marriage did not depend on 
parenting.106 
On the other hand—and somewhat paradoxically—earlier 
work on behalf of unmarried same-sex parents contributed to 
evolving understandings of parenthood, including marital 
parenthood, that supported same-sex couples’ inclusion in 
marriage.107 Opponents of same-sex marriage argued that 
marriage should promote “optimal childrearing,” in which 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 105. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 106. 135 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 107. See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34, at 1236–
40. 
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mothers and fathers raise their biological children together.108 
This view of marriage prioritizes procreative sex and dual-gender 
childrearing—attributes that do not align with the families formed 
by same-sex couples. In response, LGBT advocates did not simply 
reject the importance of childrearing to marriage, but instead 
advanced an understanding of parenting—one forged in earlier 
family law conflicts—in which same-sex and different-sex couples 
are similarly situated. Same-sex couples, like different-sex 
couples, deliberately form families in which they decide to have 
and raise children.109 This, advocates argued, is an approach to 
parenthood embedded in contemporary understandings of 
marriage. 
Courts found this logic persuasive. Consider again the 
reasoning of the federal district court that struck down 
California’s Proposition 8. “California law,” the court explained, 
“permits and encourages gays and lesbians to become parents 
through adoption . . . or assistive reproductive technology.”110 
Even more explicitly, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that, “in 
California, the parentage statutes place a premium on the ‘social 
relationship,’ not the ‘biological relationship,’ between a parent 
and a child.”111 Intentional and functional principles of 
parenthood—principles elaborated through earlier LGBT 
advocacy on behalf of unmarried lesbian and gay parents—
furnished the logic for a view of parenthood that spanned both 
marital and nonmarital families and included both same-sex and 
different-sex couples. 
The connection between same-sex parenting and marital 
parenting also appears in Obergefell, not merely in the Court’s 
description of the petitioners but also in its constitutional 
reasoning. Even as the Court explained that marriage is 
fundamental because it “supports a two-person union,” the Court 
acknowledged that marriage’s fundamental character relates in 
 
 108. See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of Robert P. George et al. in Support of 
Hollingsworth and Bipartisan Legal Advisory Grp. Addressing the Merits and Supporting 
Reversal, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (Nos. 12-144, 12-307), 2013 WL 
390984. 
 109. See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34, at 1237. 
 110. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 111. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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part to its role in “safeguard[ing] children and families.”112 
Marriage, the Court explained, “affords the permanency and 
stability important to children’s best interests.”113 Indeed, in an 
implicit nod to family law reform, the Court acknowledged that 
“[m]ost states have allowed gays and lesbians to adopt, either as 
individuals or as couples, and many adopted and foster children 
have same-sex parents.”114 Endorsing an approach to marital 
parenthood that turns on neither biology nor gender, the Court 
viewed same-sex and different-sex couples as similarly situated.115 
Ultimately, the model of marital parenthood advanced by the 
marriage equality claim looks much like the model of social 
parenthood that gradually accommodated lesbian and gay parents 
outside of marriage. 
III. CONSTITUTING PARENTHOOD 
As this Part shows, just as family law developments 
reverberated in constitutional reasoning about marriage equality, 
the constitutional acceptance of marriage equality reverberates, 
for better and for worse, in a new generation of family law 
conflicts.116 The discussion that follows illustrates this dynamic by 
drawing on developments in the law of parental recognition in 
marriage equality’s wake. Contemplating future implications of 
the mutually constitutive relationship between family law and 
constitutional law, this Part then imagines how family law reform 
of parental recognition may one day reshape constitutional 
approaches to parenthood. 
 
 112. Obergefell v. Hodges, 133 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 2599 (explaining that “the reasons marriage is fundamental under the 
Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples”). 
 116. I focus here on liberalization in the law of parental recognition, but the 
constitutionalization of marriage equality may also serve as a regressive force in family 
law, with respect to not only parental recognition but also adult relationship recognition. 
See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781 (Ill. 2016) (relying on Obergefell in denying 
marriage-like rights to unmarried same-sex couple that dissolved their relationship after 
more than two decades). For the leading scholarly treatment of this dynamic, see Melissa 
Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1207 
(2016). For a powerful argument that Obergefell may open constitutional paths to 
nonmarital rights, see Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to 
Nonmarriage, 97 B.U. L. REV. 425 (2017). 
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A. MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND PARENTAL RECOGNITION 
The model of family that justifies same-sex couples’ inclusion 
in marriage is one that marginalizes gender differentiation and 
biological procreation and instead embraces chosen and 
functional families. Now, with same-sex marriage, we are seeing a 
more wide-scale incorporation of a model of parenting based on 
conduct and intent—over a biological, gender-differentiated 
model of parenting.117 
In earlier nonmarital parenting work, LGBT advocates 
seized on marriage’s capacity to accommodate nonbiological 
parenthood. Today, advocates leverage marriage equality in ways 
that push law to more thoroughly accommodate social, 
nonbiological relationships. Donor-insemination statutes that 
recognize the husband as the legal father can similarly treat a 
woman’s wife as the “natural,” and thus “legal,” parent.118 And 
courts have increasingly applied the marital presumption—long 
capable of recognizing husbands as fathers even in the face of 
contrary biological evidence119—to lesbian couples.120 The 
parentage statutes, a New York court explained, must be 
interpreted in a “gender-neutral” manner in light of the onset of 
marriage equality, such that “the child of either partner in a 
married same-sex couple will be presumed to be the child of both, 
even though the child is not genetically linked to both parents.”121 
While the marital presumption always could conceal 
biological truth, the extent to which it did was often deliberately 
obscured.122 Applying the marital presumption to same-sex 
couples detaches the presumption from biological parenthood in 
 
 117. See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34, at 1241–
49. 
 118. See Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2295 
(2017). Clearly, same-sex parenting is connected to assisted reproductive technologies 
(ART), and both relate to shifting approaches to parenthood. In other work, I explore how 
legal regulation of ART exposes tensions between, on one hand, biological and gendered 
conceptions of parentage and, on the other hand,  intentional and functional conceptions 
of parentage. I link the expansion of intentional and functional approaches to sexual 
orientation and gender equality. See generally  id. 
 119. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 120. See NeJaime, supra note 118, at 2295. 
 121. Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S. 2d 845, 860–61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014). See 
also Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 2013); Della Corte v. 
Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). 
 122. See NeJaime, supra note 118, at 2277. 
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more obvious, deliberate, and transparent ways.123 As Susan 
Appleton argues, the presumption’s application to same-sex 
couples “highlights the way this long-established doctrine can 
construct a legal reality even in the face of conflicting biological 
facts.”124 Now, the presumption rests on the horizontal 
relationship between the partners and their mutual agreement 
regarding the parental role vis-à-vis the child.125 The same idea 
that, in large part, supported the recognition of lesbian and gay 
parents in nonmarital families furnishes the logic through which 
to understand the key provision attaching parental rights inside 
the marital family. The marital presumption begins to collapse 
with the intent-based principles applied to married and unmarried 
parents and the nonbiological reading of the conduct-based 
“holding out” presumption applied to unmarried parents. The 
marital presumption, in other words, makes sense because it 
provides an indication of intent and conduct. 
To be meaningful, the marital presumption for lesbian 
couples must be protected against rebuttal by genetic evidence. 
The presumption, in other words, must fully own its lack of 
signification of biological connection. Applied equally in the 
same-sex and different-sex contexts, this development would 
render the presumption a more thoroughly social concept across 
different-sex and same-sex couples.126 Indeed, it would cut directly 
against more recent trends toward the use of genetic evidence to 
disestablish a man’s paternity when he discovers that another man 
is the biological father of his wife’s child.127 
 
 123. See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34, at 1242 
(“With same-sex marriage, the presumption makes sense only because it provides an 
indication of intent and ‘holding out[.]’”); Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: 
Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 
227, 230 (2006) (“As applied to same-sex couples, of course, the presumption [of 
legitimacy] and its variants always diverge from genetic parentage and always produce 
what might be considered fictional or socially constructed results.”). 
 124. Appleton, supra note 123, at 230. 
 125. See Joanna L. Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status 
for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 671, 718 (2012). 
 126. Appleton, supra note 123, at 291 (“If the law permits rebuttal by genetic 
evidence, then applying the same principles to lesbian couples provides them and their 
children precious little. On the other hand, if this approach leads to the conclusion that 
genetic evidence is irrelevant to the parentage of lesbian couples, then the ‘parity goal’ 
indicates that the same principles should apply to traditional couples, making genetic 
evidence irrelevant to them as well.”). 
 127. Id. at 237. 
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While motherhood continues to represent the primary 
parent-child relationship, fatherhood is conceptualized as 
derivative of the mother’s relationship.128 Essentially, the husband 
is the father because he is married to the mother. In this sense, 
men’s relationships appear more dependent on social 
relationships yet remain secondary, while women’s relationships 
retain primacy but are rooted more fully in biology.129 Yet in an 
age of marriage equality, the policies animating the marital 
presumption—to identify the parents who intend to have and 
support the child—appear to apply to both women and men.130 
Accordingly, the presumption could apply regardless of sex, 
leading not only to recognition of a biological mother’s husband 
or wife but also to recognition of a biological father’s husband or 
wife—an argument I develop in other work.131 
Of course, many of these changes do not depend on the 
constitutional resolution of same-sex marriage. What, then, does 
constitutional law add? The constitutional recognition of same-
sex couples’ right to marry, on both due process and equal 
protection grounds, provides powerful new arguments for 
parental recognition in resistant jurisdictions. Obergefell does not 
settle the conflict over same-sex marriage but instead channels it 
in new directions.132 Parentage features prominently in post-
Obergefell disputes over the consequences of marriage equality.133 
In today’s parentage disputes, the marriage equality precedent 
can be understood in relation to the family law developments that 
gave rise to it. Marriage equality decisions credited claims to 
parental recognition originating decades earlier as a family law 
matter. Appreciating this can lead courts and legislatures to see 
parenthood as critical to Obergefell’s endorsement of the equal 
status of same-sex couples’ families. 
 
 128. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 
UCLA L. REV. 637, 644 (1993) (“fatherhood can only be presumed through a man’s 
relation to the child’s mother”). 
 129. See NeJaime, supra note 118, at 2314–15, 2328–29. 
 130. Id. at 2340. 
 131. See id. at 2339–43. 
 132. See Reva B. Siegel, Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash, 64 
UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
 133. See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34, 1243–
44. 
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Consider the federal district court’s decision in Henderson v. 
Adams.134 Even with marriage for same-sex couples, Indiana had 
not altered gender-specific terms in its parentage provisions. 
Moreover, its parentage law, unlike the UPA, does not expressly 
direct that provisions applicable to the father-child relationship 
apply to the mother-child relationship. The relevant paternity 
statute provides: “A man is presumed to be a child’s biological 
father if . . . the . . . man and the child’s biological mother are or 
have been married to each other.”135 Even though the statute 
refers to the “biological father,” the state had for years allowed a 
married woman who gave birth to a child conceived with donor 
sperm to list her husband on the child’s birth certificate. In 
refusing to provide the same treatment to the wife of a woman 
who gives birth to a child conceived with donor sperm, the state 
required the nonbiological mother to adopt the child to become a 
legal parent. 
Indiana defended its position by citing “an important 
governmental interest in preserving the rights of biological fathers 
and recording and maintaining accurate records regarding the 
biological parentage of children born in Indiana.”136 The state 
attempted to cabin Obergefell, asserting that the decision 
“actually decoupled marriage from parenthood because the right 
to marry cannot be conditioned on the capacity or commitment to 
procreate.”137 But the Indiana federal district court instead 
concluded that Obergefell had consequences for the law of 
parental recognition. Indiana had “created a benefit for married 
women based on their marriage to a man, which allows them to 
name their husband on their child’s birth certificate even when 
the husband is not the biological father.”138 “Because of . . . 
Obergefell,” the court concluded, “this benefit—which is directly 
tied to marriage—must now be afforded to women married to 
women.”139 The parentage statutes, the court determined, 
unconstitutionally discriminate based on sex and sexual 
 
 134. Henderson v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (S.D. Ind. 2016). 
 135. IND. CODE § 31-14-7-1 (2016). 
 136. Henderson, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1074. 
 137. Id. at 1076. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
NEJAIME_DRAFT 9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/17 7:02 AM 
442 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 32:413 
 
orientation.140 Obergefell provided the constitutional basis on 
which to require a resistant state to extend parental recognition 
to married lesbian couples who used donor insemination.141 
Indeed, just as this essay went to print, the Supreme Court 
explicitly recognized that Obergefell requires states to treat same-
sex couples like different-sex couples with respect to birth 
certificates. (Birth certificates do not establish parentage, but are 
evidence of parentage.) In a per curiam order, the Court reversed 
an Arkansas Supreme Court decision that allowed the state to 
refuse to issue birth certificates listing the female spouse of a 
woman who gives birth, even though the state lists the male 
spouse of a woman who gives birth.142 “Obergefell,” the Court 
declared, “proscribes such disparate treatment.”143 The Court’s 
decision will likely have immediate and significant consequences 
for the conflicts over parental recognition that have proliferated 
in Obergefell’s wake. 
B. PARENTHOOD’S FUTURE? 
Like the Henderson court, other courts have found that the 
government’s refusal to extend marital parentage presumptions 
to same-sex couples violates the guarantee of equality announced 
in Obergefell.144 In contrast to these decisions, though, the 
Henderson court ruled not only on equal protection but also on 
due process grounds. And its due process reasoning was rooted 
not in the right to marry, but instead in parental rights. The court 
concluded that the Indiana parentage statutes interfere with 
same-sex couples’ “exercise of the right to be a parent by denying 
them any opportunity for a presumption of parenthood which is 
offered to heterosexual couples.”145 To the extent this cursory 
reasoning can be read to protect the nonbiological parent as a 
matter of constitutional doctrine, it is exceptional. Parenthood’s 
 
 140. Id. Months later, the court issued an order affirming but clarifying its earlier 
decision. See Henderson v. Adams, Case No. 1:15-cv-00220-TWP-MJD, 2016 WL 7492478 
(S.D. Ind. Dec. 30, 2016). 
 141. Indiana appealed the district court’s decision. See Brief and Required Short 
Appendix of Appellant Dr. Jerome Adams, Henderson v. Adams, Case No. 17-1141 (7th 
Cir. 2017). 
 142.  Pavan v. Smith, 582 U.S. __ (2017). 
 143.  Id. (slip op. at 3). 
 144. See Roe v. Patton, Case No. 2:15-cv-00253-DB, 2015 WL 4476734 (D. Utah July 
22, 2015). 
 145. Henderson v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (S.D. Ind. 2016). 
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constitutional status has generally been limited to biological 
parent-child relationships. Henderson, then, suggests that the loop 
between family law and constitutional law might continue in the 
doctrinal space of parenthood. The elaboration of nonbiological 
parenthood in the domain of family law, including through shifts 
generated by marriage equality, might contribute to new 
understandings of parenthood as a constitutional matter.146 
While constitutional precedents on parental rights date back 
to the 1920s,147 the Court’s more extensive articulation of 
constitutional protection for parenthood began in the 1970s with 
cases on the rights of unmarried fathers.148 Even as the Court 
expanded the parameters of parenthood as a constitutional 
matter, it did so on an understanding that constitutional interests 
arose out of “natural” parent-child bonds.149 While this biological 
premise is at times simply taken for granted, often the Court has 
been explicit about the relationship between biological 
parenthood and constitutional rights.150 (Of course, once an 
individual becomes a legal parent under state law—through 
adoption, for instance—that individual possesses constitutionally 
protected parental rights. But the relevant constitutional cases 
primarily concern the rights of individuals who have not been 
adjudicated parents under state law.) 
Many developments could have provoked successful 
challenges to the biological grounding of constitutional 
parenthood. For instance, claims by foster parents contesting the 
termination of their foster placements posed questions relating to 
the constitutional interests of nonbiological parent-child 
relationships.151 But the Court resisted, affirming the importance 
of protecting “natural” parent-child bonds and leaving unsettled 
 
 146. See NeJaime, supra note 118, at 2357–59. There is a danger, of course, that 
nonbiological parenthood attains constitutional status only when tied to marriage. 
 147. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925). 
 148. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 
(1983). 
 149. See Stanley, 405 U.S. 645; Lehr, 463 U.S. 248; Caban v. Mohammed 441 U.S. 380 
(1979). 
 150. It is worth noting that in Prince v. Massachusetts, a 1944 case involving parental 
rights, the Court simply assumed that the litigant, who had her own children but was also 
the legal guardian of her niece, could claim parental authority over that niece. 321 U.S. 158 
(1944). 
 151. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 
(1977). 
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when, if ever, foster parents might have a constitutional liberty 
interest in the relationships with their foster children.152 
In contrast to constitutional doctrine, family law, over the 
past several years, has moved away from an understanding of 
parenthood limited to biological connection.153 State family law 
regimes regularly recognize parents who form nonbiological 
parent-child bonds without requiring those parents to adopt their 
children. Indeed, those bonds at times trump competing claims by 
biological parents. 
In some states, the term “natural”—generally used in 
constitutional discourse to describe biological parents154—has 
shifted. As Nicholas H. demonstrates, state courts began to 
interpret the UPA’s “holding out” provision—which turned on 
holding the child out as one’s “natural” child—to recognize a man 
as a father even when he was not biologically related to the 
child.155 Indeed, some courts did so over the objection of the 
biological father asserting paternity.156 In other words, biology 
was no longer viewed as the determinant of nonmarital 
fatherhood, and instead parental conduct was deemed more 
critical.157 In the name of functional parenthood, “natural” came 
to mean “legal,” rather than “biological.” By the 2000s, some state 
appellate courts began to apply the “holding out” presumption of 
paternity to women. Recall the California Supreme Court’s 2005 
decision in Elisa B. v. Superior Court,158 which found a 
 
 152. See id. at 846–47. Again, adoptive parents enjoy constitutionally protected 
parental rights, but those parents have engaged in formal legal proceedings adjudicating 
their rights. So, for instance, a stepfather does not attain constitutionally protected 
parental rights unless and until he adopts the child and thereby supplants the biological 
father. The Court has not articulated a constitutional parenthood doctrine that expressly 
includes nonbiological parents who are not adoptive parents. 
 153. See NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, supra note 34. 
 154. See, e.g., Smith, 431 U.S. at 845 (distinguishing the “foster family” from the 
“natural family”). 
 155. In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002), as modified (July 17, 2002). 
 156. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 157. Of course, adoption has long offered a route to nonbiological parenthood. But 
adoption creates a legal relationship after termination of the biological parents’ rights, and 
adoption continues to be viewed as an exception to normal operation of parentage rules. 
Here I am dealing with presumptions of parentage that apply regardless of biological 
connection and even when the biological parent is fit and objects to the competing 
parentage claim. 
 158. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). See also Chaterjee v. King, 
280 P.3d 283, 285 n.3 (N.M. 2012). 
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nonbiological mother to be a parent by virtue of the “holding out” 
presumption. 
In disputes involving same-sex parents, advocates argued for 
the recognition of nonbiological parents not only on family law 
grounds but also on constitutional grounds. They claimed that 
statutory and common-law parentage principles should lead to 
parental recognition, but, to the extent those principles did not 
yield recognition, the court should deem their application 
unconstitutional.159 Most of these constitutional claims were never 
resolved. Instead, courts recognizing the nonbiological lesbian co-
parent did so on statutory or common-law grounds.160 In some 
cases, though, courts reached the constitutional questions. Some 
courts accepted constitutional arguments, reasoning that equal 
protection required the extension of paternity presumptions to 
same-sex couples.161 Other courts rejected constitutional claims, 
including claims that the nonbiological mother possessed parental 
rights as a matter of due process.162 Still, the number of cases 
resolving the constitutional status of the nonbiological mother’s 
parental rights remains relatively small. 
With newfound constitutional support for the families 
formed by same-sex couples, constitutional claims of 
nonbiological parents may proliferate. Indeed, not only women 
but men in same-sex couples may assert such claims.163 Given that 
same-sex couples ordinarily include a parent without a biological 
connection to the child, the constitutional recognition of 
nonbiological parents is critical to the equal standing of families 
formed by same-sex couples. The claim to constitutional 
protection for parental rights appears, just as marriage had been, 
bound up in the equality of same-sex couples.164 With shifts in 
both family law and constitutional law on the status of gays and 
lesbians, federal courts—guided by Obergefell’s dialogic approach 
 
 159. See supra notes 70-71. 
 160. See, e.g., Elisa B., 117 P.3d 660. 
 161. See, e.g., Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Public Health, 830 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 2013) 
(ruling on state constitutional grounds); Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29 (Or. App. 2009) 
(ruling on state constitutional grounds). 
 162. See, e.g., Russell v. Pasik, No. 2D14-5540, 2015 WL 5947198, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. Oct. 14, 2015). 
 163. See NeJaime, supra note 118, at 2358–59. 
 164. See id. 
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to liberty and equality—might ultimately recognize nonbiological 
parents as a matter of constitutional due process.165 
CONCLUSION—REFLECTIONS ON (FAMILY) LAW AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE 
Missing the continuity between earlier family law work and 
more recent constitutional conflict over same-sex marriage has 
costs. Scholars, lawyers, and judges may underestimate the impact 
of family law and overestimate the impact of constitutional law. 
They may obscure family law’s role as a critical site for equality 
work and elide the influence of family law developments on 
constitutional understandings of the family. They may expect too 
much from constitutional law and give undue weight to 
constitutional resolution. 
Better understanding the role that family law plays in 
subsequent constitutional adjudication might influence a range of 
academic debates. Consider just one example. Theories of law 
and social change often focus on federal actors (including 
primarily federal courts) and federal law (including primarily 
federal constitutional law).166 Indeed, U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions articulating federal constitutional principles remain the 
primary subjects of analysis.167 Cases like Brown v. Board of 
Education168 and Roe v. Wade, for instance, feature prominently 
in debates about when, whether, and how courts should intervene 
with respect to controversial questions.169 Of course, given that 
same-sex marriage was first expressed as a constitutional matter 
under state law, critiques of judicial intervention (and litigation 
 
 165. In future work, I plan to fully explore the relationship between constitutional 
parental rights and nonbiological parent-child relationships. 
 166. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil 
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 167. Consider work on the backlash thesis, which suggests that favorable court 
decisions on questions subject to society-wide debate set a movement back by inspiring 
powerful countermobilization. This work focuses largely on U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
with respect to contested questions of constitutional law. See ROSENBERG, supra note 166; 
Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. 
HIST. 81 (1994). 
 168. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 169. Compare ROSENBERG, supra note 166, with Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Essay, 
Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 
(2007). 
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strategies aimed at such intervention) regularly target state 
constitutional decisions.170 
Critics of judicial intervention tend to approach court 
decisions in a fairly top-down way—as deciding contested issues 
in ways that may either settle conflict or squelch democratic 
deliberation and thereby inflame resistance.171 Some scholars 
have responded to these critiques by adopting a more bottom-up 
perspective that views constitutional decisions as growing out of 
popular mobilization and as reshaping conflict that continues long 
after the decision.172 Attention to the family law antecedents of 
constitutional decisions could productively contribute to this 
bottom-up account. 
One might view judicial resolution of a question like same-
sex marriage in light of developments in family law relating to the 
nonmarital recognition of same-sex-couple-headed families. One 
might consider how a separate body of law, contested at an earlier 
moment and in different venues and levels of government, shaped 
the stakes of subsequent constitutional debate.173 One might 
analyze the ultimate constitutional adjudication and its impact 
along a longer time horizon and as entangled with a broader 
constellation of issues. 
One might also view federal courts and federal constitutional 
law as less significant. Courts recognizing same-sex couples’ right 
to marry may not have boldly staked out new territory. Instead, 
they might have merely continued trends that began in family law. 
Family law reform that primarily involved unmarried gays and 
 
 170. See, e.g., Gerald N. Rosenberg, Saul Alinsky and the Litigation Campaign To Win 
the Right to Same-Sex Marriage, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 643 (2009); Michael J. Klarman, 
Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. REV. 431 (2005). 
 171. See Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 877, 879-80 (2013); Douglas NeJaime, The View From Below: Public Interest 
Lawyering, Social Change, and Adjudication, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 182, 193 (2013). 
 172. For examples of relevant sociolegal work, see Douglas NeJaime, Winning 
Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011); Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: 
Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151 
(2009); Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matter for Social Movements?, in HOW DOES 
LAW MATTER? 76, 85 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998). For examples of 
relevant legal scholarship, see Post & Siegel, supra note 169; Lani Guinier, The Supreme 
Court, 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(2008); Gerald Torres, Legal Change, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 135 (2007); Reva B. Siegel, 
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of 
the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
 173. See DAVID D. COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS 
TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 227 (2015). 
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lesbians and nonmarital rights and recognition shaped the terms 
of debate in subsequent marriage litigation. Federal courts 
accepting marriage equality claims did so after a series of 
developments, largely in state family law, that both called into 
question justifications for excluding same-sex couples from 
marriage and constituted marriage in ways that could 
accommodate the families of same-sex couples. From this 
perspective, power resides less in the domains of constitutional 
doctrine and federal adjudication and more in the spaces—
statutory, judicial, and administrative—conventionally 
understood as family law. 
 
